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David Skover: Welcome now to the panel on corporations and
political speech. We will explore the First Amendment jurisprudence of
campaign finance regulation and some of the more controversial issues
raised by corporate involvement in the marketplace of political ideas and
elections.
In July of 1997, Nation magazine published a forum entitled Speech
and Power: Is First Amendment Absolutism Obsolete? 1 The forum fea-
tured ten free speech theorists, including my coauthor Ron Collins and
me, who suggested that liberals and progressives should rethink their
traditional ideas and beliefs about free speech, given that speech is
power. Also, because massively powerful corporate conglomerates are
particularly active today in using the First Amendment to advance their
business interests, much current free speech law appears anti-democratic.
We wrote, "the trend of ceding power to the powerful represents the col-
lapse of liberalism into libertarianism, the triumph of corporate liberty
over social equality. Equality is [really] no longer one of the central prin-
ciples of the First Amendment. Incredibly, it is now a First AmendmentCevil.'"
Our notion that equality is no longer a central First Amendment
principle originated, of course, from the Supreme Court's watershed
1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo,2 the per curiam opinion popularized
by the sound bite, "money is speech," 3 at least in the context of campaign
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finance reform. But perhaps the most stunning language from that
opinion is the following:
[The Federal Election Campaign Act] is aimed in part at equalizing
the relative ability of all voters to affect electoral outcomes by plac-
ing a ceiling on expenditures for political expression by citizens and
groups.4
...But the concept that government may restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice
of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was de-
signed ... to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social change[s] desired by the people. 5
In support of this proposition, the Supreme Court cited to New York
Times v. Sullivan.6
My coauthor and I found it particularly strange and ironic that New
York Times v. Sullivan was aligned with the Buckley Court's view that
the First Amendment could tolerate no equality principle permitting the
government to enhance the voice of the relatively dispossessed. After all,
the First Amendment defamation law of New York Times v. Sullivan was
developed to protect African American clergymen, who had libeled a
southern segregationist governmental official in an advertisement in the
New York Times entitled, "Heed Their Rising Voices."7
At least as a matter of constitutional history, the intrinsic relation-
ship that existed between Fourteenth Amendment equality norms and
First Amendment speech rights cannot be denied. The modem First
Amendment reached its nadir when it was married to the equality norms
of the Fourteenth Amendment, going beyond New York Times v. Sullivan
to NAACP v. Alabama,8 Edwards v. South Carolina,9 Brown v. Louisi-
ana10 and NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co.," I among many other de-
cisions. During that period, every civil rights lawyer took as gospel that
the First Amendment was to be used as a vehicle to buttress the anti-
discrimination principles of the Fourteenth Amendment in the interest of
political and social equality. Free-speech scholar Harry Kalven, Jr. built
4. Id. at 17.
5. Id. at 48-49 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
6. 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
7. Id. at 256.
8. 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
9. 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
10. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
11. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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the academic case for that alliance in his celebrated book, The Negro and
the First Amendment. 1
2
It is obvious that, theoretically speaking, equality norms of some
character must exist within the First Amendment. For the free speech
guarantee to operate at all to protect political dissent, it must operate to
shift power. In other words, one cannot really talk about the First
Amendment without talking about the presence of some significant
power-leveling principle. How much can and should the First Amend-
ment operate to level the playing field of political and socioeconomic
power? There's the rub.
Of course, reasonable minds may differ as to the extent of the role
of equality norms within free speech law. Since we are extremely fortu-
nate today to have three eminently reasonable minds on our panel, I will
leave it to them to explore the degree to which the First Amendment can
and should tolerate governmental regulation of powerful individual and
corporate voices in the political marketplace of ideas.
Each of our panelists is an expert in his or her own right in the
arena of corporations and political speech. In the order in which they will
be speaking to you, I give you, first, Martin Redish, the Louis and
Harriet Ancel Professor of Law and Public Policy at Northwestern Uni-
versity School of Law. A nationally recognized authority on civil proce-
dure, federal jurisdiction, constitutional law, and freedom of expression,
Professor Redish is the author of some seventy-five articles and fifteen
books, the most recent of which is a work on free expression in the
McCarthy era, called The Logic of Persecution.'3 Two of his earlier
books are very closely tied to the topics of the hour, Freedom of Expres-
sion: A Critical Analysis,14 in which Professor Redish lays out his First
Amendment normative value theory of individual self-realization, and
Money Talks: Speech, Economic Power, and the Values of Democracy,15
in which he dedicates an entire chapter to free speech and the flawed
postulates of campaign finance regulation. I would suspect that some of
the more fundamental ideas from those works will sneak their way into
his presentation today.
Professor Redish may be known to you as the lead author of the ex-
cellent case book, Federal Courts,16 and the accompanying treatise,
12. HARRY KALVEN JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966).
13. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY
ERA (2005)
14. MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984).
15. MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY (2001).
16. MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS (6th ed. 2006).
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Federal Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power. 7 But
for me, personally speaking, Professor Redish is a longstanding friend.
Marty graced my coauthor Ron Collins and me with his trenchant
and unabated criticism of one of our earliest articles. The revised version
of that piece found its way into the first chapter of our book, The Death
of Discourse,'8 and Marty can still be found there as one of the critics
engaged in our orchestrated print dialogue.
Next, I give you Scott Thomas, a specialist in campaign finance,
ethics, and lobbying laws at the federal and state level. Mr. Thomas cur-
rently has a political campaign law practice at the firm of Dickstein
Shapiro in Washington D.C. From 1986 to 2006, however, he served as
commissioner of the Federal Election Commission, holding the chair-
manship four times, during some of its stormiest periods. Mr. Thomas
has written extensively in the field of campaign finance, including sev-
eral law review articles and numerous opinions and statements of reason
regarding Federal Election Commission decisions.
I know Scott Thomas, however, as a close personal friend-we
worked together as colleagues from 1975 to 1976 in the Federal Election
Commission, where we drafted regulations and advisory opinions. Scott
Thomas, I am delighted that you are among us today.
Finally, I give you Lisa Danetz, a campaign finance and election
lawyer at the National Voting Rights Institute. Ms. Danetz has spear-
headed the organization's federal election campaign enforcement work.
She has advised officials and other advocates on the National Voter Reg-
istration Act, has handled constitutional litigation seeking public finance
in North Carolina, and has drafted legislation and published articles on
campaign reform. Ms. Danetz also wrote an amicus brief regarding cor-
porate political speech for the Nike v. Kasky19 case. Her expert advice on
voting right issues has guided many newspaper reporters across the na-
tion, and she has frequently been interviewed in this regard on radio and
television shows. Thank you so much for joining us today to explore the
parameters of corporations and political speech.
Martin Redish: Thank you so much. Professor Skover didn't men-
tion that the first line of my critique of their work said, "with friends like
Collins and Skover, the First Amendment is in no need of enemies." So
I'm glad that not only will he defend to the death my right to say that, he
still considers me a friend, because I certainly consider him one.
17. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER (2d ed. 1990).
18. RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE (2d ed. 2005).
19. 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
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I'm entitling my talk, "Turning Into the Skid." For those of you
who ever lived in places like Chicago where there's a lot of ice, when
your car skids, they tell you to turn into the skid. This advice is com-
pletely counterintuitive. You initially want to turn away from the skid,
but you're going to get into a lot of trouble turning that way. But if you
have enough faith in the system that taught you to turn into the skid,
you'll come out okay.
That's what I say about the First Amendment and campaign finance
reform. It is both distressing and shocking that so many individuals
whom I normally consider political and constitutional allies abandon the
First Amendment when it comes to campaign finance reform. I look at
the cases finding campaign finance limitations unconstitutional, and I
look at the dissents, and I see all the liberal justices, or at least what
passes for liberal justices. But the closest thing we have to liberals now
are on the anti-free speech side, and I find myself aligned with Justice
Thomas, for whom I have enormous respect. But I am not normally his
intellectual, ideological, or constitutional bedfellow.
So, when thinking about the issue of campaign finance spending
and campaign finance reform and the First Amendment, I would ask you
to separate out the extent to which you find the political results distaste-
ful. Instead, think about the broader constitutional values involved,
which are on occasion going to lead to political results you don't appre-
ciate. The fact that I believe that campaign finance limitations are
unconstitutional says nothing about my politics.
To illustrate, Professor Skover mentioned that I wrote a book a few
years ago called, Money Talks.20 I gave a copy of that book to my col-
league Steve Presser. Steve is an old and dear friend, but he's also ex-
tremely right wing. In response, he wrote me an e-mail-not saying
thank you for the book, congratulations, nothing like that. The e-mail had
one line: "Redish, I always knew you were a closet Republican."
This email was quite a shock to me. I wrote back to him, explaining
that the fact that I can defend the First Amendment rights of corporations
and commercial advertisers no more means that I am a Republican than
the fact that people who defended the free speech rights of Communists
in the 1940s and '50s meant that they were Communists. Again, he wrote
me back one line: "Weren't they?" To this day I haven't had the nerve to
ask him whether his response was a joke. I don't think I actually want to
know the answer to that question, but this anecdote illustrates the ap-
proach I'm asking you to take. Whenever my free speech theory comes
to a conclusion that's consistent with my own personal political values, I
20. REDISH, supra note 15.
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immediately go back and rethink it because I may have been fudging.
Look at this issue from that perspective.
We start out with a question, is money speech? Well, of course it is.
How could anyone suggest the contrary? In fact, there's a contradiction
on the part of those who want to regulate it. They want to regulate it be-
cause it buys so much communicative power. But then they say it's not
really speech. Well, consider a law that says newspapers are not allowed
to pay for newsprint. They can publish, but they're not allowed to pay
their workers. One might say that such a law regulates only money, not
speech, and that it doesn't stop the newspaper from publishing. But that
interpretation would be nonsense.
Very often you are required to spend money to speak. For example,
if government forbids picketers from purchasing sign board and magic
markers but otherwise allows them to make signs as long as they spent
no money on it, you would be significantly interfering with their ability
to communicate effectively. The more money spent, the more communi-
cation. The less money spent, the less effective the communication.
When government restricts the ability of a candidate to spend money,
when it restricts the ability of a contributor to contribute, it is reducing
the ultimate flow of communication to the electorate.
Now, maybe we should want that. We can debate whether we want
to reduce the flow of information to the electorate, but don't kid yourself
about what's happening. Once you realize what is going on, the severe
harm to basic First Amendment values is obvious, no matter what one's
theory of the First Amendment is. We could take a theory that is antago-
nistic to my own theory. We could take Alexander Meiklejohn's political
speech concept.2' It doesn't matter.
Members of the electorate are really the governors. The voters are
the governors. The people we put in office are just agents, Meiklejohn
told us. Therefore, as governors, we perform our governing function in
the voting booth. We need as much communication of information and
opinion as possible from both sides, all sides, so we can be better in-
formed. The less money that can be spent, the less communication. In the
area of free speech, that is a core concept. I've been arguing for years
that speech protection should go well beyond political speech, but politi-
cal speech is what we're talking about. Mark Lopez talked before about
the law that says sixty days before a general election and thirty days
before a primary, you can't take out an issue ad if it mentions the
21. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT.
REV. 245 (1961).
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candidate.22 What a constitutional outrage. That restriction significantly
disrupts the flow of information to the electorate.
One could make the argument that as long as we leave the limits
sufficiently high, enough speech is getting out. The problem, however, is
deciding who gets to figure out what is "enough." In faimess, Alexander
Meiklejohn would probably accept that argument, because he embraced
the fallacy of the New England town meeting, where everybody sits
around and each person gets up and talks. The town meeting takes place
in a confined space, where everyone knows who's talking and who's
listening.
That's not, however, the way a campaign works. It's impossible to
know who saw an ad on TV or read an ad in the newspaper just because
the ads were out there. Given that impossibility, at what point can we
decide there has been "enough" communication? Setting some arbitrary
barrier is completely inconsistent with the basic notions of free, uninhibi-
ted, robust, and wide-open speech.
It is true that some contributions and expenditure limits have been
held unconstitutional, and the Court continues to view them as unconsti-
tutional. Contributions have been afforded a watered-down kind of pro-
tection, and the Court's attitude could be described as, "in for a dime, in
for a dollar." Whatever amount you can give, you have exercised your
associational rights. That's like saying as long as you're allowed to work
one day as a campaign volunteer, you don't have to be allowed to volun-
teer five days a week because during that one day you've exercised your
political associational rights.
One of the sad ironies is that as a result of the Buckley dichotomy,23
we swam halfway across the river. Now rich people aren't limited in
what they can spend, but those without a substantial fortune have trouble
competing with the rich people because they're limited in what others
can contribute to them. We're left with a completely incoherent system
that, in fairness, Congress didn't intend, but by the Court's split
constitutional analysis, we have ended up with.
What arguments justify campaign finance regulation? Of course,
the argument is "equality." We need to make everybody equal. But equal
in what sense? What about a law that says no one can say anything about
anything? Is that equal? No one can say anything, right? No one has an
advantage. But surely that would violate the First Amendment. Merely
satisfying equality is not enough if it's an equality of ignorance. Imagine
22. See Ronald Collins et al., Corporations and Commercial Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
895, 909 (2007).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding federal limits on campaign contributions
but allowing candidates to contribute unlimited amounts of money to their own campaigns).
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that candidate A has $50,000 to spend, and candidate B has $200,000 to
spend. The problem is that the public really can't get to know candidate
A because candidate A only has $50,000. So what do we do? What if we
limit candidate B to $50,000 so that the public is equally ignorant about
both of them? Is this consistent with what the First Amendment is about?
Is this consistent with the notion that we need an informed electorate? I
really don't think so.
But what about the danger that contributions can lead to corruption?
Well, I suppose it depends on how one chooses to define the word
corruption. Does corruption mean bribery? We already have laws against
bribery and many contributions are made with no possible basis of brib-
ery. Yet we still use this corruption-bribery concern as a justification for
restricting the amount of contributions, even though there's absolutely no
empirical basis for doing so.
Finally, the argument has been made that if money isn't restricted,
those with the money can control the political agenda. Well, there's an
inconsistency there as well, because if those with money control the po-
litical agenda, how did these campaign finance laws get passed in the
first place? Regardless, this argument degenerates into a basic political
value choice that one doesn't like the ideological basis of the agenda
made by those with money. Frankly, I'm not a big fan of that agenda my-
self, but that's not the point. We need to separate ourselves and our own
narrow political views from higher process-based values. In the end,
we're turning into the skid, meaning that the car should stop without
anyone getting hurt. Thank you very much.
Scott Thomas: I am delighted to be here, and I want to briefly
thank my good friend David Skover for this opportunity. We have known
each other a long time. Years ago at the Federal Election Commission he
did remarkable work as we were trying to figure out what sort of rules
consistent with the First Amendment should be implemented for dele-
gates who want to help someone become a president. He sifted through
all of the delegate practices, all the delegate rules, all the campaign fi-
nance rules, and put together a coherent set of laws in the form of regula-
tions. If you ever decide you want to become a presidential delegate, you
could pull out about five or six pages of Federal Election Commission
regulations; they are the same ones that David Skover wrote in 1976, and
they still work.
We also have some other history worth mentioning. We were on
opposite sides of a case that reached the United States Supreme Court.
The California Medical Association24 case does not get much discussion
24. Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
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these days, but it will. The case involved a challenge by the California
Medical Association to the limit on the size of contributions that could be
given to a federal PAC each year. The association was unincorporated
and wanted to be able to give more than the $5,000 limit to provide
administrative support to the California Medical Association PAC.
And this young man David Skover had written a very good law re-
view article 25 predicting the $5,000 limit was going to fall because it was
unconstitutional. I was on the other side of the case, working for the FEC
at the time, and had the thrill of going to the Supreme Court. I was third-
chairing during the argument, meaning I wasn't in danger of ruining the
case personally.
I have to say all these years later that the lawyer on the other side
was largely responsible for our winning the case. First, Justice Rehnquist
asked him a question about a particular case that was in his own brief,
and the lawyer didn't appear to have any idea what the case was about.
Second, that lawyer enraged Justice Marshall because the lawyer was
trying to make the argument that the contributions were administrative
support and didn't really do anything to support candidates. The lawyer
argued the contributions had nothing to do with supporting the goals of
the PAC. Justice Marshall thought that argument was somewhat insult-
ing, and leaned over to this attorney and he said, "So what are you talk-
ing about? Booze? Women?" That was essentially the nature of the
argument, and we at the Commission were able to successfully defend
the constitutionality of that particular provision.
That is a little kernel of something I wanted to share with you. In
the jurisprudence of campaign finance laws, there's a remarkable amount
of the law basically determined by the quality of lawyering. There is
some brilliant thinking that goes into preparing cases that reach the Su-
preme Court, but the quality of argument really does make a significant
difference. And if you don't believe that, study the record of the
McConnel 26 case. It had fantastic lawyering on both sides. But I've
never seen anyone who was as brilliant a lawyer in the Supreme Court as
the current Solicitor General, Paul Clement. He argues without notes and
is flawless. He basically won the case for the government, defending the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 200227 (BCRA) provision.
But all of that is water under the bridge. I wanted to start out by
saying, with regard to Professor Redish's comments, that I think what he
25. David Skover, The Constitutionality ofLimitations upon Donations to Political Committees
in the 1976 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments, 86 YALE L.J. 953 (1977).
26. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
27. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.).
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has written is really a thorough analysis. It cuts to the core of whether
these arguments about campaign finance laws hold water or not. Since
the article was written initially in the Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law,28 a lot has happened. The developed record of the McConnell
litigation helped explain and further the concern that campaign finance
laws are addressing. This concern is that if some individuals have vast
amounts of money to support candidates who are eventually elected, the
chances are very high that the supporting individuals have a good shot at
getting their policies enacted in the legislature or in the executive branch.
The underlying concern is that there is a danger that government ac-
tion can be bought, and that these officials are weak enough that they
will endeavor to make a deal. You will never see anything as clear as a
bribery connection, nor will you see the understanding or the agreement
made. It's a very subtle process, a delicate dance. But I think a lot of
people saw, coming out of McConnell, a very thorough record of situa-
tions where people who had been in the campaign process, like former
senators Simpson and Simon, said this happens. 29 They said that as legis-
lators, they knew about soft money donors and knew what was ex-
pected. 30 That process is so unseemly that I believe the repugnance is the
driving force behind support for campaign finance laws.
That being said, I also want to say that these laws are a real jumble
and are very hard for people in the political process to understand. The
FEC started with an "in connection with a federal election" standard and
a "for the purpose of influencing federal elections" test. 31 The Buckley
case considered an independent expenditure made "for the purpose of
influencing" an election and the question of whether the expenditure was"relative to a clearly identified candidate." 32 And that is where the Court
said the influencing test is not clear enough; an "express advocacy ' 33
standard was necessary. So then we marched along with the "express
advocacy" standard.
The Federal Election Commission time after time tripped and
stumbled, while everybody in the world knew what these advertisements
were. We at the FEC didn't seem to be able to get anyone to say that
28. Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Finance Reform, 3
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 783-818 (2001).
29. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 149-50.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 144.
32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
33. See id. at 43-44.
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these advertisements were "express advocacy," an inability that
ultimately led to the rage that you saw behind BCRA.34
I think Members of Congress were willing to go along with essen-
tially any legislation that would at least try to establish bright lines with
which people could feel comfortable. Some may not like these bright
lines. However, if an advertisement makes reference to a clearly identi-
fied federal candidate; is run within sixty days of the general election;
reaches the targeted electorate; is not run in some other part of the coun-
try; and is on radio or TV, it makes sense to conclude that on balance the
advertisement can be deemed election-advertisement communication.
And those types of advertisements will be subject to restriction-
corporations cannot use their treasury money to fund such ads. PACs can
spend for that kind of ad, as can individuals. It's not as though those
types of advertisements will disappear.
So that is the landscape we have. There is a long array of different
tests that have been tried over the years, but the speech is still generally
happening. It's going on, and the government is always a couple steps
behind, which brings me to my last point. The reality is, at least from my
perspective, that there really hasn't been a great deal of restriction of
corporate speech in this area. As a practical matter, these days you have
the ability to put out an advertisement. That said, you do have to steer
clear of an advertisement that would be deemed express advocacy, so
you do not want to put "vote for" or "vote against" in the message. But
that is not too difficult to accomplish.
You also need to steer clear of making your advertisement a coor-
dinated communication. In other words, you cannot coordinate in the
development of the communication with the candidate or the party com-
mittee. And then you need to avoid the rule we just talked about, the so-
called electioneering communication rule: if you want to run a television
or radio advertisement close to the election, make sure it does not contain
the name of a particular candidate. You can still beat the tar out of some-
one without making a reference to him or her as a candidate or making
reference to him or her at all.
If you have a situation where everybody understands that one can-
didate supports the President on the Iraq war and the other does not, you
can simply put out an advertisement to the effect, "We don't want some-
one in Congress who doesn't support our President on the Iraq war." You
can have a dramatic impact and use corporate resources without falling
prey to any of these election restrictions. There is still great leeway for
34. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
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corporate speech. We have seen the ads, and we see large sums of money
being put into these kinds of communication.
Therefore, as a practical matter, I don't see these laws having had a
dramatic negative impact on the ability of corporations to speak in the
political process. This carries over, by the way, into the lobbying sphere,
grassroots lobbying, and grassroots lobbying ads. As an example, you
can craft an ad that says, "Senate Bill 666 is truly diabolical. It will ruin
America," and then you can just say, "Call Congress. Tell them to stop it.
Tell them to vote no." You are not making reference to any particular
federal candidate; you can be as hard on that legislation as you want; and
you can put that kind of ad on radio or TV any time you want. You can
spend as much corporate (or union) money as you want.
So I don't think there is an effectively real and measurable restraint
on the ability of corporations, or unions for that matter, to get out their
political speech.
Lisa Danetz: I'm an attorney with the National Voting Rights Insti-
tute. Our mission is to ensure meaningful political participation regard-
less of socioeconomic status. I'm sure that you can imagine what my an-
swer would be to the question of whether money should equal speech.
As a practical matter, the question of whether money is considered
speech from a jurisprudential basis has been answered many times over
by the Supreme Court, unfortunately not in the direction I would prefer.
Buckley 's35 equation of money with speech was reaffirmed just this last
term in Randall v. Sorrell.36 Even in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber
of Commerce, a case that those of us who are in favor of campaign fi-
nance reform revere and in which the Court upheld restrictions on corpo-
rate participation in the political process, the Court said the use of funds
to support a candidate is speech.37
So what am I going to talk about? I really want to reframe the ques-
tion. I want to ask you to think not about the abstract legal arguments,
but to focus on the reality of what actually happens in the political proc-
ess. Before that, I want to take a step back because there are some really
important questions that need to be answered prior to the question of
money and speech, and more particularly, money, speech, and
corporations.
The important questions are: How do you ensure adequate repre-
sentation in a democracy? Does that relate to political equality? How do
you ensure that there is meaningful discussion of issues such that multi-
ple viewpoints are considered? Does that require participation by the
35. 424 U.S. 1.
36. 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
37. 494 U.S. 652, 657 (1990).
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citizenry? And if so, how do you ensure that that participation is
meaningful in some way, not just cursory?
The answers to all of these questions are of constitutional signifi-
cance. When you are dealing with campaign finance and campaign
finance reform, the First Amendment is not the only constitutional value
at stake. The issue is not just related to speech rights of the affluent. It is
about structuring a system where you can have meaningful discussion
and participation so that there really is true "consent of the governed,"
and where that consent is also informed. In our current system where
money equals speech, elections often come down to a simple matter of
economics: who raises the most money wins.
A few stories about that: a couple of years ago in Virginia there was
a Senate race. In that Senate race, the Republican incumbent was running
unopposed. A woman went to the Democratic Party and said she would
like to run against the incumbent as the Democratic candidate, given that
the Democratic Party had no other candidate. This happened in Decem-
ber, and the Democratic Party of Virginia told this woman to come back
in May if she could raise a million dollars. If she was unable to raise a
million dollars, the Democratic Party did not want her wasting its time;
the Party would rather have an unopposed election. I don't think an un-
opposed election yields a meaningful discussion of ideas.
In the 2004 races for state legislators, the candidates who spent the
most money won 87% of the time.38 In that same year for U.S. House of
Representatives elections, the candidates who spent the most money won
97% of the time. 39 1 would be remiss if I did not tell you that part of that
result was due to the advantages of incumbency. However, in a study of
open seats where incumbency was not a factor, four out of the five of the
higher spenders won the election. 40 The study showed that as the ratio of
spending between the candidates increased, so did the likelihood of vic-
tory for the higher spending candidate.41
This is not my idea of a functioning democracy. I do not believe
that the amount of money a candidate can raise is equivalent to political
support or votes.
38. MARK DIXON, NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, MONEY AND INCUMBENCY:
ADVANTAGES IN STATE LEGISLATIVE RACES, 2004 3 (July 20, 2006), http://www.followthemoney.
org/press/Reports/200607201 .pdf (last visited May 17, 2007).
39. Opensecrets.org, The Big Picture, 2004 Cycle-Winning vs. Spending, http://www.open
secrets.org/bigpicture/bigspenders.asp?Display-A&Memb=H&Sort=D (last visited April 6, 2007).
40. See CHRISTOPHER M. DUQUETTE, CTR. FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, DOES MONEY BUY
ELECTIONS? EVIDENCE FROM RACES FOR OPEN-SEATS IN THE US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
1990-2004 3 (February 2006), http://pubchoicesoc.org/papers_2006/duquette.pdf (last visited May
17, 2007).
41. Id. at 14.
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How does a candidate raise the most money? As Professor Redish
has pointed out, there are no spending limits. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held them to be unconstitutional.42 There is no set amount at
which a candidate can say, "Enough. I can stop now, and I can focus on
other things." As a result, candidates must focus on the narrow range of
supporters who can give the most money. No particular moneyed interest
is replaceable, because there is no point at which a candidate can stop
fundraising.
That is simply reality, and policy positions reflect it. That means
that the most important part of our democracy happens not when a voter
pulls the lever, pushes the touch screen, or puts a ballot in the optical
scanner at a polling place. The most important part of our democracy, in
choosing our candidates and coming up with policies, happens before
anybody gets to the polling place. The small subset of people who are
able to contribute the majority of money essentially decide the candidates
and the issues to be discussed as well.
That may not be a problem if this subset of people is somehow rep-
resentative of the population. But they are not. Less than 1% of the U.S.
population makes a financial contribution over $200 to federal candi-
dates, but those contributions represent the vast majority that candidates
receive from individuals. 43 Of that less than 1%, approximately 85%
have household incomes of $100,000 or more compared to 13.7% of the
U.S. population. 4 Seventy percent are male, compared to slightly less
than 50% in the U.S. population, and 96% are white.45 This is just not
representative of the populace. If political money is the dominant factor
in campaigns, even if it does translate into speech, then less than 1% of
the population is able to participate in the most important part of democ-
racy. Why is this a problem? It is a problem because it affects representa-
tion. There is no effective representation when 98% or 99% of the
population is not involved in the process.
Getting back to how the system really works, there are basically
two different situations that exist. First, there are incumbents who raise
so much money that they deter any challengers from running against
them. There is no discussion of issues because there is no contest, and
42. See Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
43. UNITED STATES PUB. INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP EDUCATION FUND, THE ROLE OF
MONEY IN THE 2002 CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 16 (2003); see also Spencer Overton, The Donor
Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 76 (2004) ("Al-
though approximately 51.3% of voting-age Americans cast a ballot in the 2000 general presidential
election, less than 2% contributed $200 or more to a presidential or congressional candidate.").
44. Overton, supra note 43, at 76.
45. Overton, supra note 43, at 102.
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thus no need for any debate. That is one reason we end up without ade-
quate representation.
In the other situation, the vast majority of time a candidate spends
fundraising is spent with a very small subset of the population. That sub-
set of the population gets to express its opinion over and over again.
There is nothing inherently wrong with that; however, it means that the
candidate potentially hears minority positions so often that the candidate
get a skewed sense of what the populace believes. If you hear from all of
the people you surround yourself with, "X policy is a good idea," and the
remaining 99% of the population cannot express their opinions--or if
they do, it is in a much smaller way-you are going to think that the
viewpoint of the 1% is the more prevalent view. So the effect of money
amplifies the speech of the wealthy in a way that has nothing to do with
the merits of the ideas. To me, that means democracy is nothing more
than marketing or branding. This affects policy.
Social science research indicates that spikes in contributions to in-
cumbents occur in order to affect policy outcomes, not to express support
for a candidate.46 This is the same reason for bribery. As an example
about policy outcomes, consider the bankruptcy bill. The first draft of the
law was written in the mid-1990s by lobbyists for the credit industry. As
they explained it themselves, the lobbyists then shopped the bill to
friends in Congress, who then advanced it. It was passed and vetoed by
President Clinton. It was a top priority of the credit industry, and they
didn't give up. It was derailed a second time by abortion politics, and
then enacted finally on the third try.47
Was the bankruptcy bill the best policy? The law generally made it
more difficult for individuals, although not businesses, to declare bank-
ruptcy. Academic research shows that about half the families in bank-
ruptcy filings have serious medical problems.48 Two-thirds of those who
file for bankruptcy have lost a job or a small business. 49 Twenty percent
have suffered a family breakup, such as a husband who disappeared, a
46. See Thomas Stratmann, The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions
Everything?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 85 (1998); Thomas Stratmann, How Reelection Constituencies Matter:
Evidence from Political Action Committees' Contributions and Congressional Voting, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 603 (1996); Thomas Stratmann, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting: Does
the Timing of Contributions Matter?, 77 REV. ECON. & STAT. 127 (1995); Thomas Stratmann, Are
Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action Committees, 100 J. POL. ECON. 647
(1992); Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy? Deciphering Causal Effects of
Money & Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606 (1991).
47. See William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143, 171 (2007).
48. Elizabeth Warren, Editorial, Show me the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A21.
49. Id.
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wife who died, or a family separated by long distances. 50 So we have a
law for the economic benefit of a major industry, a law coming on the
backs of the poor and down-trodden, working class, sick, and the down-
on-their-luck. This is not how to arrive at the best policy outcome.
And then there is a long line of case law invalidating voting re-
quirements that skew representation based on financial clout, rather than
the interest of the whole community or the strength of ideas, voting
requirements that undermine our political system; think of the poll tax
cases, 5 1 think of the Guarantee Clause. 52 In the late 1800s, the Supreme
Court said that a distinguishing feature of a republican government is
legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose legitimate acts
may be said to be those of the people themselves. 53 As the Court said in
Reynolds v. Sims, "legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legis-
lators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. 54
I believe all of this calls out for campaign finance regulation. How-
ever, I also want to step back for a moment and talk about the metaphor
of election campaigns to the marketplace of ideas, a metaphor with
which I am not sure I agree. Even if you accept that as the appropriate
mode of analysis, campaign finance regulation is needed. Essentially,
less than 1% of the population has a monopoly on the political process
and the ideas and issues discussed. Think about how that kind of monop-
oly would be addressed in the financial market. In the 1990s, Internet
Explorer became the dominant browser over Netscape. Why? Even
though there was broad consensus that Netscape was considered the bet-
ter product, Explorer won out in the market because of a Microsoft
monopoly over operating systems. Microsoft leveraged dominance in
one area to prevent competition in another, and the government inter-
vened to ensure proper market functioning.
This is essentially what has happened in our political system. The
need for money has eclipsed almost all other factors, possibly all other
factors. As a result, the vast majority of the populace is shut out of the
system. Just like in the context of Explorer, the better products are not
winning. Instead we have policies for those with a monopoly over the
system. Those with economic power are leveraging their power into the
political arena. It is truly a triumph of market values, and the triumph has
occurred at the expense of those values not accounted for by the rational
market.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
52. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 4.
53. See Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891).
54. 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
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These are the externalities of the money-equals-speech regime:
concepts like fairness, inclusion, broad participation, and ultimately
meaningful consent of the governed.
David Skover: Thank you. Now that you've heard our panelists,
you understand why we're so excited to have all three of them present to
you today. I'm going to ask one question of all three panelists, although
it's directed first to Professor Redish. And then I will moderate question
and answers from a discussion session.
Professor Redish, your argument as I understand it, essentially
equates viewpoint discriminatory regulation, which we would all agree is
First Amendment violative, with the equalization of economic resources
in political election campaign speech, which we clearly do not all agree
is First Amendment violative. Why do you not accept that if there could
have been a constitutionally permissible New Deal in the regulation of
economic labor markets, there cannot be a constitutionally permissible
New Deal in the regulation of the economic speech market?
Martin Redish: First, I need to get a question on the table, because
I may not get the chance. I just want to throw out to the panel the ques-
tion, if feminist groups say to a candidate, if you promise to support the
ERA, we will work for you and send out a mailing and get the vote out
for you, is that a bribe?
But back to your question, it's a great question, David. I'm re-
minded of the story that may be apocryphal, but I would like to think it is
not. When the original National Recovery Act (NRA), the one that was
held unconstitutional during the first part of The New Deal, 55 was shown
to Benito Mussolini, the Italian dictator, apparently he said in Italian,
"Ah, now there's a dictator." Frankly, if you really want to be honest
about it, a lot of the New Deal violates some pretty foundational consti-
tutional principles. If what you're saying, as might someone like Bruce
Ackerman, is that we've all seen a burning bush and we've got a consti-
tutional moment and things have changed-which I suppose describes
the New Deal-then I suppose you're right. Just be careful what you
wish for. A lot of people thought the McCarthy era was a
constitutional moment about the First Amendment.
Scott Thomas: The question, which has been alluded to several
times, is whether we have to narrow our constitutional analysis of com-
pelling interests to the inquiry of whether corruption is present or appar-
ent.
The Supreme Court does not find this analysis exclusive. For ex-
ample, in Austin, the Court applied the concept that corporations are
55. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
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unique creatures with the ability to amass huge war chests based on
commercial activity, expend unlimited amounts, and act independently
without candidate coordination.56 If it's express advocacy, it might ulti-
mately distort the political marketplace. It might have the effect of
freezing out the little guy because the little guy will not have the basic
opportunity to get on the airwaves. The little guy will not be able to
compete in the marketplace with only one commercial.
The Supreme Court has already gone down that road a little bit. In
some of the more recent Supreme Court cases, a couple of Justices have
come forward with the concept that these campaign finance laws are an
effort to basically further the speech of the little guy. In opposition to
what Professor Skover started out with, one may view this as the Su-
preme Court restraining one sort of free speech to promote the speech of
others. However, Justice Breyer may be retreating from this position.
The concept is out there. It may develop; I suppose you all have noticed
the Supreme Court has recently changed, and it is not likely that the
current Court will promote this theory.
Audience Participant: Professor Redish, in a country that ex-
presses itself as a democracy-defined as a government established by
rule of the people, designed to protect those people-are we losing out
on what a democracy is by turning corporations into "people?" At no
point were people transformed into entities, and corporations are still
entities. I am having a hard time wondering how I convince my students
to continue trying to be involved if they cannot have access without
money-because money is the means.
What happened to all those things that were put into place to help
people have access because we required the media to give access to per-
sons regardless of the massive millions and billions of dollars that it now
takes to have access to the media?
Martin Redish: First, entities have some rights similar to individu-
als, and we protect many of those rights. For example, we protect unions
and partnerships. Ironically, if you go back to the history of the Ameri-
can corporation, it really developed during the Jacksonian period where
the common man took power, because the corporation was the only way
the common man could battle the heavy money interests of Virginia and
New England.57
I realize it does not look that way now. It is too myopic of a view to
state that the corporation is this robotic, slavish, profit-maximizer. We
have to recognize why people form corporations in the first place. They
56. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
57. See Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial Speech
Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 571 (1997).
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form corporations as a means of self-realizing, as a means of getting
from point A to point B. So corporations, while if you view them nar-
rowly are acting myopically, they are really a means to a broader self-
willed end. They are a kind of catalytic self-realization.
And as to democracy, democracy is not a situation where govern-
ment can stop people from communicating to the voters in choosing their
elected officials. And no matter which way you slice it or dice it, that's
what this campaign finance reform is.
Lisa Danetz: I just wanted to make another comment. Notwith-
standing my comments earlier, I would suggest that not all is lost. Al-
though I believe that money is generally outcome determinative in
elections, it is not always. Moreover, there are certainly policies that one
might support, like public campaign financing, that help the little guys,
because candidates get public funding after they show a certain level of
voter support.
Audience Participant Ron Collins: Ms. Danetz, as a progressive I
do not find it categorically problematic that money is outcome determi-
native. Let me give you an example. In 1990, my former boss, Hans
Linde on the Oregon Supreme Court, a very esteemed, revered jurist,
found himself challenged for his seat on the court by a young upstart in
his 20s. The challenger was a prosecutor who had basically gone to
MADD and victims' rights groups and painted Hans Linde as this demon
because he defended the Bill of Rights and the state constitution. For
months, Linde was on the ropes with one bad story after another, after
another, and of course he was going to take the "high road" and not re-
spond. Linde's clerks came back to Oregon, and organized a campaign
with his grudging blessing. At the end of the day, the Linde campaign
outspent his competitor five to one. There were TV ads. There were radio
ads. There were newspaper ads. Big firms had given to his campaign. A
few corporations had given to his campaign. Wealthy people had given
to his campaign.
Money was outcome determinative at the end. Hans Linde won, and
he should have won. And the reason he won, or at least one reason is be-
cause with that money we were able to go to TV, to radio. We were able
to say, this is who Hans Linde is, and this fellow running against him is
no match for him and should not be any match for him, and but for that
money, that message would have never gotten out. It was five to one, the
money, and his opponent complained that he was the small guy and
could not compete. At the end of the day, I think the people made the
right decision, and I also think the money made a difference.
Lisa Danetz: I am not suggesting that money has no place in the
system. You may remember that I started my talk by saying I think there
2007]
Seattle University Law Review
are a lot of constitutional values in campaign finance regulation. For in-
stance, Professor Redish's hypothetical about the law that nobody can
spend anything would not accomplish my purposes either, because I am
not somebody who thinks that one constitutional value should trump all.
I also think there is a certain amount of money that is required to com-
municate in the modem era. Here is my problem with that. I think this is
actually a logical fallacy in Buckley5 8 and, with all respect, in Professor
Redish's discussion.
Martin Redish: I will defend to the death your right to say that.
Lisa Danetz: Simply because communication depends on the ex-
penditure of money, not all expenditure of money in the political realm is
communication. The logical fallacy is called "affirming the consequent."
There are certainly campaign expenses that do not relate to communica-
tion. More money does not always equal more speech, and better and
more useful speech. Campaign expenses include staff, office space,
consulting, polling. None of those relate directly to communication, and
that is not to say they are not necessary, but there is no reason why the
concept of budgeting cannot enter into the campaign calculus.
That said, I will also say that an expert associated with anti-reform
advocates, Dr. John Lott, specifically said that increased campaign
spending in state and federal elections in recent years is not the result of
an increase in the cost of getting the candidate's message out to voters,
but instead is a function of the growing size of government.5 9 So, in other
words, campaign spending is a function of increased funding from inter-
ests determined to secure favorable government policies, rather than a
function of increased communication and debate.
So I guess the answer to your question is, yes, there is a certain
amount of money that is necessary. However, that does not mean that
money should always dictate the outcome.
Audience Participant: As a follow-up to that question, and maybe
to bring this issue a little bit closer to home, we are still in the midst of a
sort of brutal Supreme Court election process here in Washington. Sub-
sequent to the last election, the legislature passed a bill last year to limit
campaign contributions to judges,60 and there will probably be some fur-
ther legislation to try to go to public financing for the judicial system.
And as I was listening to you speak, I was thinking, at least for
elected representatives and senators and the governor, they go out and
they say they stand for something, but we sort of do not want judges to
58. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
59. See Landell v. Sorrell, 118 F. Supp. 2d 459, 469-70 (D. Vt. 2000).
60. An Act Relating to Campaign Contribution Limits, ch. 348, 2006 Wash. Sess. Laws 1695-
96, § 2 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17).
[Vol. 30:931
Corporations & Political Speech
do that. The same principles are not involved. So my question is whether
there is any legal distinction in campaign reform in the judiciary as com-
pared to other types of elected representatives.
Scott Thomas: So far the Court is saying there is not really a dif-
ference. Even judges have to have the opportunity to state what their po-
sitions are. There is some latitude to restrict the ability of judges to basi-
cally indicate their commitment on a particular issue that is very likely to
come before them in the courts. There may be a little bit of leeway there.
Martin Redish: Although when Ron Collins mentioned law firms
contributing to Justice Linde's campaign, I think of the story of the plain-
tiff giving the judge $10,000, the defendant giving him $5,000; the judge
calls them in and says, I am giving the plaintiff back $5,000 and deciding
the case on the merits.
I think there is an enormous difference because of the due process
element. Adjudicators are supposed to be providing due process to the
litigants before them, which doesn't apply to the other candidates; there-
fore elected judges should be deemed unconstitutional. Logically, the
inherent notion that people could influence judges through their support
is a due process problem.
Audience Participant: I wanted to follow-up on something Scott
Thomas was saying about uncoordinated campaigns being used to get a
message out. Certainly we saw that with our judicial campaigns here,
where we had all these "527 groups"'6' pushing things out. The current
system that we have encourages having uncoordinated campaigns and
having things come from different voices. But that does not fix the cor-
ruption problems. Just as a candidate knows who contributes to her, she
also knows who is contributing to the 527 groups. So is there some
intrinsic benefit to society to try to have the money go through these
other organizations rather than just go through the candidate?
Scott Thomas: Traditionally, the Court has distinguished between
coordinated speech, which can be treated like a contribution, versus in-
dependent speech, where very few restrictions can be imposed. Now, for
corporations, the Court does state that even non-coordinated speech that
rises to the level of express advocacy can be prohibited.
Many of the 527 groups are chomping at the bit to get a case into
court because the issue is going to be that these groups are spending
61. This term refers to groups that are organized under § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code and
that operate largely outside the Federal Election Commission's jurisdiction. Allison R. Hayward &
Bradley A. Smith, Don't Shoot the Messenger: The FEC, 527 Groups, and the Scope ofAdministra-
tive Authority, 4 Election L.J. 82, 82 (2005). Since the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
116 Stat. 81 (2002), restricted the ability of state and local political parties to raise and spend non-
federally regulated funds, 527 groups, which face fewer "soft-money" restrictions, have become
more visible in the election landscape. See id. at 82-83.
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money independently. There is no coordination on the end with the can-
didates; therefore, they will argue that there should be no restraint on
how much an individual can give a group like this. That would be the
case even if this group's major purpose is influencing elections, such that
it could be what the Supreme Court has indicated is a "political commit-
tee," making it subject to regulation.
The California Medical Association decision stated that limits on
giving to the California Medical Political Action Committee could be
sustained. 62 That opinion and, subsequently, McConnell,63 suggest that it
does not make a difference whether the group in question is making in-
dependent expenditures. You can still put a limit on how much is given
to that group.
In the next Supreme Court term, the FEC is probably going to try to
go after some of the 527 groups that made so much news in the '04 cy-
cle. Those groups are going to fight back by arguing that the First
Amendment is violated by efforts to treat them as political committees
and to attach limits on how much they can receive. Now, in terms of val-
ues and whether the system is running amok, I think there is a distinction
that if you do something in coordination with a candidate, it should be
treated as an in-kind contribution, and I am happy to regulate that as con-
tribution activity. I am also happy to limit contributions given to these
independent spending groups as well.
If you think about it, and this goes way back to the Supreme Court
analysis in Buckley,64 is it really likely that someone who has given a
truckload of money to one of these independent expenditure groups is
not going to expect to get that visitation with the successful candidate
down the road, regardless of how independent the message was during
the election? I mean, that is the reality of independent expending. There
is a fairly good argument, and this will come out in all this litigation, that
you are entitled to limit contributions to those kinds of groups for that
very reason. You have the same kind of problem, whether they are an
independent expending group or not.
Audience Participant Charlie Cray: Recently in the Washington
Monthly, Washington Post reporter Jeff Birnbaum wrote an interesting
article stating that following the Abramoff scandal, federal prosecutors
will be developing a bribery attack on lobbyist gifts and campaign con-
tributions based on the timing of the contributions in relation to legisla-
62. Cal. Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201 (1981).
63. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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tive actions that are related to the lobbyist's interests.65 I wonder how the
panel might view that and how successful it will be.
Also, it seems to me that it is a very limited assertion to suggest that
unions or others can equally enter the marketplace of ideas and buy time
on television because there are many values in society that are not organ-
ized by money that cannot get represented on the airwaves. Is the most
effective means of systemic democracy to return the federal airwaves to
a system where you do not have to pay to get access, limiting the need
for candidates to raise so much money to advertise over the airwaves?
David Skover: Let me address your second point. You are suggest-
ing that a strategy for effective reform may be essentially to eliminate the
economic market for speech that has come with the government's relin-
quishment of its property-the airwaves-to for-profit corporations.
Excellent question. Assuming that no such action is forthcoming-
we can imagine how difficult that might be to ram through Congress, not
to mention the possible Fifth Amendment 66 takings implications-your
question is addressing the reality that there is an economic scarcity in the
political speech marketplace. I think a false assumption of many political
speech libertarians, perhaps including Professor Redish, is that more
speech is always better, and more speech is always available to those
who can pay. But that is a false assumption. Not only is time on the air-
waves very expensive and scarce, but we have also seen clear private
censorship. For example, the corporate-run media often will select out
opinions of peoples who are willing to pay for airtime and often will call
that editorial judgment. Countless additional examples are covered by
my coauthor in an excellent work called Dictating Content,67 which deals
with the private censorship of the media, totally uncontrolled by the First
Amendment, in not accepting well-heeled critique of positions they do
not want communicated.
A fantasy land that more speech is better underlies the view of the
libertarian speech theorists in this regard-a fantasy land that does not
exist. The fantasy holds that there is not a limited pie, and we do not
need governmental interference because all ideas well up as long as there
is money to pay for them. I find that assumption highly questionable.
Martin Redish: There are qualitatively different issues here. On
the one hand, shutting down the speech of the spenders-the speech of
65. See Jeffrey Bimbaum, The End of Legal Bribery, WASH. MONTHLY, June 2006, available
at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2006/0606.birnbaum.html (last visited May 17,
2007).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67. RONALD K.L. COLLINS, DICTATING CONTENT: HOW ADVERTISING PRESSURE CAN
CORRUPT A FREE PRESS (1992).
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those with money-reduces everyone to the lowest common denomina-
tor. On the other hand, increasing the access of those who do not have
money raises all voices. While there are unique questions surrounding
the latter issue, the key problem with the former is that suppressing the
expression of those with money does nothing to increase the exposure of
those without money. All it does is produce an equality of ignorance.
In response to David's point that more speech is not always good,
that may be true. But do we want the government deciding where to draw
that line? I just think of the Clint Eastwood line, "Feeling lucky,
punk?" 6
8
Audience Participant Jeff Chester: Political candidates are spend-
ing $1.6 billion this year on local television. The overwhelming majority
of that expense is, in fact, for advertising, which is pervasive throughout
both the digital media and broadcast environments.
But the fact of the matter is that the stations are able to charge the
highest rate. No one buys the cheapest airtime because that airtime
reaches fewer viewers. The airtime that offers the maximum demo-
graphic targeting is sold to the highest bidder at a very high rate. Conse-
quently, even those people who have great resources cannot compete
because the station only has one ad to sell that will have the most impact.
The major problem is that we have allowed broadcasters to determine
based on their bottom line how to charge political candidates and decide
who gets access.
Martin Redish: While you raise a very important issue, it's an
issue that is separate from keeping the state from limiting expenditures
by private parties.
Audience Participant: I would like to go back to that example
where people with money have more access, and your assumption is that
they are going to give the voters more information. The problem with
that assumption is that they are just shouting the same message louder. I
disagree both with the assumption that more communication makes for a
better informed voter and with Virginia Pharmacy' S69 premise that more
communication makes for a better informed consumer. Both of these as-
sumptions are false at some point because there is only so much informa-
tion that can be taken in and heard. At some point, it becomes just a
bunch of people babbling and shouting at each other.
Martin Redish: How do we know where that point is?
68. DIRTY HARRY (The Malapaso Company & Warner Brothers Pictures 1971).
69. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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Audience Participant: What is the impediment to limiting every-
one, including corporations, in regards to the amount of money they can
put in?
Martin Redish: But how do you know they are not limiting it at a
point before the babble starts?
Audience Participant: Well, but then you are getting into a
viewpoint thing.
Martin Redish: No, that is not a viewpoint issue.
Audience Participant: Yes, it would be. If you did not apply it
across the board ....
Martin Redish: No, a law that said no one can say anything is
across the board. That does not make it constitutional.
Audience Participant: But we are not necessarily saying that no
one can say anything, and that is not a question to be answered right here
and right now, that's a question to be litigated. The point is that your as-
sumption is false that voters become more informed when the people
with money have even more money to get their messages out. That is not
necessarily true. They are just shouting louder.
Martin Redish: Well, that is an empirical assertion for which you
have no empirical basis. But regardless, I am not going to allow the
government to draw the line.
Audience Participant: What is the empirical basis for the assertion
that voters are better informed when expenditures are virtually
unlimited?
Martin Redish: The issue is where the default lies, and the default
lies with the First Amendment. We should not allow government to draw
some artificial line and paternalistically say, at this point, people are
going to get confused, or they have already heard enough.
Audience Participant: But in reality, we have limited resources.
Only so much speech can be communicated and heard.
Martin Redish: But who knows how much? Like I say, half of ad-
vertising expenditures are wasted. They just do not know which half.
Audience Participant: I find it really frustrating in all of this that
millions of dollars are spent on advertising, and the voters do not learn
anything new; almost everybody is suspicious about what they hear. I
think another problem is that part of the marketplace of ideas is discus-
sion, discussion like we're having here today that is missing in the elec-
torate. Our two party system has deprived us of debate. We have candi-
dates who want the job, but who also dictate the job interview. As a re-
sult, we are a society that stays polarized. I think we could probably
check a lot of this spending by making people publicly stand up and
defend their ads if those ads are a distortion of the truth.
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I think there is something missing from the discussion, and I do not
know how to get it back. I think it is more noticeable in the high profile
races, but Americans need to realize that life is not black and white. I
think these polarizing ads on both sides are really keeping us from seeing
the grey and getting to the common good.
Martin Redish: Sometimes things are black and white. I saw an ad
in Illinois that said, "my opponent supports George Bush." That's good
enough for me.
Lisa Danetz: I think you raise several good points. They represent
the crux of why a lot of people are in favor of campaign finance reform:
voters no longer feel like they have any meaningful part in the political
process. And I can tell you that in the Randall7° case in Vermont, the rea-
son why the specific campaign finance law, enacted in the late 1990s,
included both public funding and mandatory spending limits is because
Vermont had a real culture and history of the kind of New England town
meeting that everybody here thinks no longer exists. It did exist in Ver-
mont. The people in Vermont were also worried about losing that history
to the modem form of campaigning. At that time in Vermont, a house
campaign could be run for approximately $2,000. Candidates in each
district would knock on every door and speak to every voter, a tradition
that Vermont's constituents wanted to preserve.
Audience Participant Erik Jaffe: I find much of this discussion in-
teresting because it assumes that voters are cheap. It assumes that voters
are ignorant creatures who need our protection. When you talk about the
political process being completely captured by 1%, you never mention
that the other 99%, or at least the voting eligible percentage, can still
vote, and that populist campaigns are often quite successful.
I find odd the notion that the ability to engage in extended speech in
the market is the only means of exercising political power. The Vermont
legislation is a wonderful example of that notion. Knocking on every
door is a quaint way of communicating with voters. As it turns out it's
not the most effective way because the candidates in Vermont were more
successful when they bought newspaper ads for $4,000 instead of knock-
ing on doors for $2,000. (TV ads are largely pointless in these cam-
paigns.) The newspaper ads reached a bigger audience. People perused
them at their leisure. Whatever it was, candidates who bought newspaper
ads ended up getting their message out better, or at least they thought
they did, which is all that matters.
Lisa Danetz: A couple of things in response to that. First, just as a
factual matter, most candidates in Vermont actually did not buy $4,000
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ads in newspapers, but rather put essentially free ads in newspaper circu-
lars. But the question about whether voters are ignorant suggests that you
think that 1% can determine the candidates and policy and the other 99%
can pull the lever. The problem is that I don't think that equates to full
and meaningful political participation.
As far as what a candidate considers effective, I think it depends on
the definition of effective. A candidate wants to win. That does not mean
that the candidate necessarily wins by having a full and meaningful de-
bate of issues with other candidates. For example, look at current cam-
paign techniques. When there is a clear frontrunner, the common strategy
right now is to not agree to debate. That strategy does not serve the First
Amendment, It does not serve democracy, and I think that simply be-
cause a candidate decides that expensive communication will be more
effective, that doesn't mean constitutional interests are being served.
Audience Participant Mark Lopez: The most compelling issue here
is the question Professor Redish posed at the outset. I cannot figure out
what is wrong with an advocacy group, for example NARAL or a teach-
ers union, raising as much money as they can and using that money to
achieve their advocacy agenda? To me, this is the most compelling issue
in the campaign finance discussion.
Martin Redish: Actually, I think I was making a slightly different
point. I was saying that instead of raising money, what if advocacy
groups agree to volunteer their time and effort to a candidate who agrees
to support their position? Logically, such volunteering would seem to be
as much bribery as saying, "If you come out against the ERA, I will con-
tribute." If it's a quid pro quo-whether it's money or time and effort-it
is bribery.
Scott Thomas: I think it is a timely topic, and it goes to the ques-
tion this gentleman asked: what is going on with Washington, D.C.? Is
the concept of bribery suddenly getting expanded to take into account
somebody providing political support to someone? And I think the an-
swer is maybe it is. You look at some of the Department of Justice
prosecutions recently; they are going beyond what traditionally had been
done, by looking at the wire mail fraud statutes.
The Department of Justice is asserting that if someone commits to
helping with political support and then in the next conversation discusses
the legislation they want, the Department of Justice is now thinking
about weaving those kinds of situations into what they call deprivation of
honest services of that public official. They are prosecuting people on
that legal theory. This may not be the greatest opinion to hear for those
of us who believe in open government and the right to petition legislators
on legislation in progress.
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It is a little scary for a lot of people in Washington. I spend a fair
amount of my time now attempting to advise people in the business
community or other communities, such as the labor community, regard-
ing where the lines are going to be in terms of prosecutions for these new
theories of law.
But to come back just a tiny bit, even under the wildest of Depart-
ment of Justice theories, I think there is a distinction between bribery and
legal campaign contributions, and campaign finance laws are designed to
fit in that niche. A bribe is where someone has an outright agreement to
help with a campaign in return for favors in the legislature. An illegal
gratuity is where it is clear that there was an effort to reward someone for
a particular legislative effort they undertook or they will undertake.
Legal campaign contributions stop short of bribes or illegal gratuities.
These campaign contribution situations, as I said earlier, are very
subtle. There is a commitment to help somebody raise money, and
there's an expression of gratitude. Then, there is a separate meeting, and
there is a discussion about what is needed in Washington. That is what
campaign finance restrictions are designed to regulate. They exist to pre-
vent somebody from walking into a situation with so many financial
resources at their disposal that they will be able to get whatever they
want because that amount of money will, the legislator knows, virtually
guarantee winning the race.
David Skover: Thank you, panelists. This was a wonderful
discussion.
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